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Local Man Phones Spiritual Leaders, Ends
Up in Federal Prison: Congressional
Commerce Power to Curb Discrimination-
Motivated Violence
United States v. Corum'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the American federalist system, the Constitution gives the national
government tremendous power in certain areas and very little in others. In
recent years, the constitutional constraint on congressional powers has placed
Congress in the difficult position of needing to draft legislation to ensure the
safety and welfare of all Americans while having very little clear authority to
address the problem. This is especially true in the "new frontier" of civil
rights legislation targeting gender, racial, ethnic nationality, and religious-
animus-motivated violence.
Unlike the situations in which Congress relied on the Commerce Clause3
4 .5to create civil rights legislation ensuring equal access and opportunity,
where legislation is needed to prevent and criminalize violence, Congress
cannot rely on the Commerce Clause. This substantial constraint results from
the fact that the Commerce Clause does not authorize Congress to extend
positive rights in areas traditionally within the competence of the states with-
out a showing of a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 6 Non-economic,
1. 362 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 865 (2005).
2. For example, the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress immense power to
remedy discrimination and civil rights violations caused by state action but no ability
to address purely private action. On the same note, congressional commerce power
only extends to those activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
as activities with a lesser effect directly implicate state police power.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which states in pertinent part, "The Congress
shall have Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
4. For example, with Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress ensured
equal access to all public accommodations "affecting interstate commerce." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a (2000).
5. For example, with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress sought
to eliminate discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, and national ori-
gin in all industries affecting commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
6. Furthermore, because the "new frontier" of civil rights legislation does not
involve state action, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is of no avail. See, e.g.,
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 619-27 (2000). (holding that Congress does
1
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criminal activity targeting protected groups from discrimination generally
does not substantially affect commerce by itself.7 However, when aggregated
and spread across the nation in the form of violence against women, church
arson or bombings, or other offenses the violence can have substantial effects8
on commerce.
Where Congress has acted to prevent such violence, it has had to tread a
cautious path in trying to keep its use of power within constitutionally-
defined limits while still utilizing the resources of the federal government. In
some cases, the violence might occur in interstate commerce, or through the
infrastructure supporting it, over which Congress has expansive power.
9 In
other cases, congressional power is limited to only those activities which
substantially affect commerce. 10 In treading this path, Congress has been very
aware of the limitations imposed by the Constitution."
not have authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect victims of gender-
motivated violence without state action). Id. at 619.
7. See Morrison, 592 U.S. at 617 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 568 (1995) ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect
on interstate commerce.")).
8. For example, the abuse suffered by one woman at the hands of her spouse
does not substantially affect interstate commerce, as it does not change the movement
of money and resources across state lines. However, according to the Centers for
Disease Control, the cost of domestic violence exceeds an estimated $5.8 billion per
year, with nearly $4.1 billion in the direct costs of medical and mental health care and
nearly $1.8 billion in the indirect costs of lost productivity. CDC Injury Center, Costs
of Intimate Partner Violence Against Women in the United States, available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv cost/0iexecutive.htm (last modified July 21,
2004). At times, these effects can create the feel of a national epidemic. For example,
in crafting the Church Arson Prevention Act, Congress was responding to a rapid
increase of church arsons over the period of a year and a half, many in predominately
African-American churches. 142 CONG. REC. S7418-03 (daily ed. July 8, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Frist).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1), which states:
A person who travels across a State line or enters or leaves Indian country
with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse or inti-
mate partner, and who, in the course of or as a result of such travel, inten-
tionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to
such spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in subsec-
tion (b).
10. See 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (2000 & Supp. II 2002), which provides:
[w]hoever, through the use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, or other in-
strument of interstate or foreign commerce, or in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, willfully makes any threat ... concerning an attempt
or alleged attempt being made, or to be made, to kill, injure, or intimidate
any individual or unlawfully to damage or destroy any ... real or personal
property by means of fire or an explosive shall be imprisoned for not more
than 10 years or fined under this title, or both.
[Vol. 70
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In United States v. Corum,12 the Eighth Circuit examined two categories
of congressional commerce power used to eradicate religious discrimina-
tion.13 The result in this case perpetuates a split among the circuits regarding
the extent of congressional authority to regulate non-economic, criminal ac-
tivity. 14 This Note examines the parameters of the Commerce Clause and the
continuing confusion in the Courts of Appeals following the Supreme Court's
holdings in United States v. Lopez'5 and United States v. Morrison.16
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On July 28, 2001, Minnesota resident Gary Corum called three Twin
City area synagogues and left threatening phone messages on their answering
machines.17 The messages threatened physical harm to members of the syna-
gogues and suggested that the caller belonged to a Neo-Nazi, Aryan Suprem-
acy organization. 18 Corum's messages also threatened the use of arson or
explosives to damage or destroy the synagogues. 19 Employees of the syna-
gogues immediately contacted the police, who referred the matter to the
FBI.
20
The United States indicted Corum on three counts of violating the
Church Arson Prevention Act. 21 Corum was further indicted on three counts
of using a telephone to threaten members of or destroy the property of a
See also Morrison, 529 U.S at 618 ("The regulation and punishment of intrastate
violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in
interstate commerce has always been the province of the States.").
11. See 142 CONG. REc. S7098-04 (daily ed. July 16, 1996) (joint statement of
floor managers regarding H.R. 3525, the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996).
12. 362 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2004).
13. Id.
14. See infra notes 87-119 and accompanying text.
15. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
16. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
17. See Corum, 362 F.3d at 491.
18. Id. In his second call, made to the Bet Shalom Temple, Corum stated, "Listen
my Jewish Zionist friends, we're tired of playing games with you. We are going to
take over the planet. You're going into gas chambers." Id.
19. Id. In his first call, made to the Bais Yaakov School, which is housed in the
Bais Yisroel Synagogue building, Corum said "We're gonna blow your fucking syna-
gogue up this coming week and send you fuckers to the gas chambers. So good luck
in trying to protect your fucking synagogues from the Aryan race. Heil Hitler!" Id.
20. Brief for Appellant at 9-10, United States v. Corum, 362 F.3d 489 (8th Cir.
2004) (No. 03-2497).
21. Corum, 362 F.3d. at 491-92. The Church Arson Prevention Act, in pertinent
part, penalizes whoever "intentionally obstructs, by force or threat of force, any per-
son in the enjoyment of that person's free exercise of religious beliefs, or attempts to
do so" when the offense "is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. §
247(a), (b) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
2005]
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22
synagogue in violation of 18 U.S.C § 844(e). Prior to trial, Corum made a
motion to dismiss all six counts.2 3 He challenged the constitutionality of the
Church Arson Prevention Act on the basis that it was an unlawful exercise of
Congress' Commerce Power in that "intrastate telephone threats to religious
organizations have no nexus to interstate commerce. 2 4 Additionally, Corum
argued that Section 844(e) was unconstitutional as applied because tele-
phones, when used to make intrastate calls, are not an instrument of interstate
commerce.
2 5
Following a hearing before a magistrate judge, the district court con-
cluded that both acts were constitutional. 26 It held that the indictment con-
tained an ample factual basis to fulfill the interstate commerce elements of the
Church Arson Prevention Act and Section 844(e).27 At trial, the jury found
28Corum guilty on all six counts.
Corum moved for a judgment of acquittal, asserting that the Church Ar-
son Prevention Act and 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) were unconstitutional, that the
government had failed to meet its burden of proving the interstate commerce
element, and that a telephone used to place an intrastate call did not constitute
an instrumentality of interstate commerce.29 The district court denied his mo-
tion.3"
Corum appealed to the Eighth Circuit, claiming that his convictions un-
der Section 844(e) should be set aside because the government had failed to
prove his conduct was in or affecting interstate commerce and, alternatively,
because the statute as applied was unconstitutional because his threats did not
substantially affect interstate commerce.3' Corum further argued that his con-
22. Corum, 362 F.3d at 491-92. The statute provides:
[w]hoever, through the use of the mail, telephone, telegraph, or other in-
strument of interstate or foreign commerce, or in or affecting interstate or
foreign commerce, willfully makes any threat ... concerning an attempt
or alleged attempt being made, or to be made, to kill, injure, or intimidate
any individual or unlawfully to damage or destroy any.., real or personal
property by means of fire or an explosive shall be imprisoned for not more
than 10 years or fined under this title, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 844(e) (2000 & Supp. 112002).
23. Corum, 362 F.3d at 492.
24. United States v. Corum, No. CR: 01-236 JRT/FLN, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12394, at * 14-15 (D. Minn. 2002), adopted by United States v. Corum, Criminal No.
01-236 (JRT/FLN), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10185 (D. Minn. 2002), aff'd, 362 F.3d
489 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 865 (2005).
25. Corum, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12394, at *14-15.
26. Corum, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10185, at *9-10.
27. Corum, 362 F.3d at 492. In so ruling, the district court adopted the ruling of




31. Id. at 492.
(Vol. 70
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victions under the Church Arson Prevention Act should be set aside because
the government failed to show that the offense affected interstate com-32 3
merce. The Eighth Circuit upheld Corum's conviction.3 3 For the purposes of
Section 844(e), it held that when an accused uses a telephone to convey a
threat, the government need not prove anything beyond the use of the tele-
phone to establish the element of interstate commerce.34 The use of a tele-
phone, even for purely intrastate calls, falls within congressional Commerce
Power to regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce and, thus, affects
interstate commerce.35 The court further held that the government presented
sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Corum's threatening phone calls to
three local synagogues affected interstate commerce.36
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution states that
"Congress shall have Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among the sev-
eral States. 37 The power of Congress to regulate commerce has historically
been, and remains today, one of its most far-reaching powers for addressing
38economic and social concerns.
32. Id. at 497. Corum also appealed his conviction on the grounds that the
Church Arson Prevention Act facially violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Id. at 495-97. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held the statute non-
violative of the Constitution as it had a secular purpose, neither advanced nor inhib-
ited religion in its primary or principle effect and did not foster excessive entangle-
ment with religion. Id. at 496-97.
33. Id. at 497.
34. Id. at 495.
35. Id. at 494-95.
36. Id. at 497. The court's reasoning fails to make clear whether it adopted the
district court's rationale that religious organizations engage in and affect interstate
commerce. See United States v. Corum, Criminal No. 01-236 (JRT/FLN), 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10185, at *10- 11 (D. Minn. 2002). For discussion about the Eighth Cir-
cuit's probable rationale for its second holding, see infra notes 134-54 and accompa-
nying text.
37. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
38. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942) (holding that congressional
commerce power to restrict the production of wheat extended to farmers growing
wheat solely for personal consumption because the production affected a wider range
of economic regulation). See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 537 (1985) (holding minimum wage provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act
applies to employees of state governments by virtue of congressional commerce
power); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1964) (holding that congres-
sional commerce power extended to barring discrimination in restaurants through the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 because discrimination affects the sale of interstate goods
and, thus, a part of a larger economic regulation ensuring the free flow of goods inter-
state); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (holding that
2005]
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In Gibbons v. Ogden,39 Chief Justice John Marshall defined congres-
sional Commerce Power expansively, as:
the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which com-
merce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Con-
gress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution.... If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty
of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to
those objects, the power over commerce . . . among the several
States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single
government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the
exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United
States.4°
As a result of this expansive reading, the modem Court has broadly in-
terpreted the congressional power to regulate commerce, suggesting that vir-
41
tually all economic activity falls within the scope of the Commerce Clause.
As Justice Kennedy stated in United States v. Lopez, "[Marshall's] statements
can be understood now as an early and authoritative recognition that the
Commerce Clause grants Congress extensive power and ample discretion to
determine its appropriate exercise. '42 However, the breadth of the Court's
interpretation of the Commerce Clause is not without limit.
In Gibbons, Marshall admitted that, in a system of limited enumerated
powers, the Constitution demarks a level of commercial activity that is be-
yond the province of congressional power.43 He stated that "[t]he completely
internal commerce of a State ... may be considered as reserved for the State
itself."44 For almost one hundred years, the Court followed Marshall's para-
digm, finding that "[c]ertain activities ... were . . .within the province of
state governments and beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause. ,
45
commerce power extended to eliminating discrimination in public accommodations
through the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because such discrimination impacts interstate
travel).
39. 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
40. Id. at 196-97. Marshall underscored the breadth of his interpretation by de-
fining the term "commerce" broadly. He stated that it was more than "traffic" be-
tween states, it was "intercourse," suggesting that the clause implicated more than
mere trade. Id. at 189.
41. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
42. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995), (Kennedy, J., concurring).
43. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194-95.
44. Id. at 195.
45. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 121.
[Vol. 70
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Despite Marshall's concession, beginning in 1937 with NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp,46 the Supreme Court has upheld congressional power
to regulate purely intrastate commerce in a wide range of legislation.47 For
almost sixty years, Congress used its commerce power to enact economic,
social, and civil-rights legislation touching every comer of the nation.
48
In United States v. Lopez, the Supreme Court halted Congress' unmiti-
gated use of the Commerce Clause to attack social problems.49 Lopez, a
twelfth-grade high school student in San Antonio, Texas, was convicted of
violating the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 199150 because he entered school
grounds carrying a concealed weapon and ammunition. 51 The Supreme Court
reversed Lopez's conviction on the ground that the Act was an unconstitu-
tional use of congressional commerce power.52 In so holding, the Court iden-
tified three broad areas which implicate the congressional power to regulate
interstate commerce.5 3 First, Congress may regulate the "channels of inter-
46. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
47. See, e.g., Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 36-38 (1937) (upholding
the National Labor Relations Act under constitutional challenge as a valid exercise of
commerce power). See also, RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH? 41-42 (2002).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-23 (1941) (holding the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 constitutional, as the manufacture of lumber affects
interstate commerce); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-29 (1942) (holding that the growth of
wheat for purely private use affects interstate commerce); North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327
U.S. 686, 700-07 (1946) (holding Congress may regulate the ownership of securities
by operating companies through its commerce power because such ownership affects
interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258
(1964) (holding the 1964 Civil Rights Act constitutional, as a privately-owned motel
affects interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1964)
(holding that congressional commerce power extended to barring discrimination in
restaurants through the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because discrimination affects the
sale of interstate goods and thus a part of a larger economic regulation ensuring the
free flow of goods interstate); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 188, 192-93 (1968)
(holding that congressional commerce power rightfully extended labor condition
regulations of the Fair Labor Standards Act to any "enterprise engaged in com-
merce"); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1985)
(holding the minimum wage and overtime pay provisions of the Fair Labor Standards
Act constitutional under the Commerce Clause and applicable to employees of state
governments).
49. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(l)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). The statute made it a federal
offense "for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individ-
ual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone." Id. The Act further
defined a school zone as on school property or within 1,000 feet of a school. 18
U.S.C. § 921 (a)(25) (1988 ed., Supp. V).
51. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
52. Id. at 552.
53. Id. at 558-59.
2005]
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state commerce."5 4 Second, Congress may "regulate and protect the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate com-
merce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.,
55
Third, congressional commerce power extends to "regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce."
5 6
A. 18 US.C. § 844(e)
Even prior to Lopez, a number of courts of appeals undertook to define
the meaning of "instrumentalities of interstate commerce" in light of modem
advances in industry and technology. 7 The Court had traditionally interpreted
this area of Commerce Clause jurisprudence to include railways, vehicles,
and aircraft.5 8 Given the dramatic changes in both the traffic and intercourse
of interstate commerce, this category now encompasses a great deal more
54. Id. at 558.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 558-59.
57. In United States v. Kunzman, the Tenth Circuit rejected a challenge to the
court's federal jurisdiction over securities fraud. 54 F.3d 1522, 1527 (1 0th Cir. 1995).
The circuit court held that "[a]s long as the instrumentality used is itself an integral
part of an interstate system, Congress may regulate intrastate activities involving the
use of the instrumentality under the federal securities laws." Id. The Tenth Circuit
also noted that the government need not establish a nexus between the conduct and
interstate commerce because the use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce was
sufficient to establish the jurisdictional element. Id.
In United States v. Weathers, the Sixth Circuit examined the defendant's
conviction under the federal murder-for-hire statute. 169 F.3d 336, 337 (6th Cir.
1999). The court found that the defendant had communicated his desire to contract for
murder through the use of a cellular phone. Id. The statute required the use of the
"mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (1996).
Weathers contended that the jurisdictional element was lacking because the phone call
was purely intrastate. Weathers, 169 F.3d at 339. Following the Supreme Court's
logic in Lopez, the Sixth Circuit determined that the intrastate nature of the telephone
call did not defeat federal jurisdiction because without the interstate system of cellular
towers and communications equipment the call would not have been possible. Id. at
342; see also United States v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
cellular phones, as well as their identification numbers, are instrumentalities of inter-
state commerce).
58. Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914) (holding that congressional
authority to regulate railroads as instrumentalities of interstate commerce extended to
regulating all aspects that have a close and substantial relation to interstate com-
merce); S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20, 26 (1911) (holding all locomotives,
vehicles or railroad cars to be instrumentalities of interstate commerce); United States
v. Perez, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971) (noting that congressional commerce power ex-
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than just shipping lanes and air routes.5 9 As a result of the rapid advances in
telecommunications, several federal circuits have explicitly included the use
of intrastate instrumentalities that are a part of an overall interstate system
within the meaning of "instrumentalities of interstate commerce" despite the
charges of congressional overreaching. 6°
Most pertinently, in United States v. Gilbert,6 1 Gilbert was charged with
making a telephone bomb threat in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). 2 On ap-
peal to the First Circuit, Gilbert argued that the government failed to produce
evidence showing that the telephone system used by her call was part of or
63
routed through an interstate system. In resolving the controversy between
intrastate and interstate instrumentalities, the First Circuit held that because
all intrastate telephone systems are a part of a larger aggregate system, "[t]he
use of the telephone ... to make a bomb threat was, without more, sufficient
to sustain jurisdiction under the [I]nterstate [C]ommerce [C]lause." 64
B. The Church Arson Prevention Act
Both the second and third categories of permissible interstate commerce
regulation, the instrumentalities of commerce and the activities with a sub-
stantial relation to commerce, govern Corum's challenge to the Church Arson
Prevention Act. The period between Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp and Lopez
was clearly the high-water mark for social legislation targeted at protecting
civil rights.65 The effect of Lopez as applied to the substantial relationship to
interstate commerce category of regulation has resulted in a significant de-
59. See United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 320 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that
the intrastate use of Western Union to transfer funds satisfied the jurisdictional re-
quirement of the Travel Act because it is an instrumentality of interstate commerce);
United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the intrastate
use of an ATM qualified as an instrumentality of interstate commerce).
60. Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974).
It is not required by [the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] or the rule that
the manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance be a part of or actu-
ally transmitted in the mails or instrumentality of interstate commerce; it
is sufficient that such a device or contrivance be employed in connection
with the use of the instruments of interstate commerce or the mails.
Id. at 737; see also United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that
private and commercial interstate carriers are instrumentalities of interstate commerce
"notwithstanding the fact that they also deliver mailings intrastate").
61. 181 F.3d 152 (1st Cir. 1999).
62. Id. at 153.
63. Id. at 157.
64. Id. at 158-59.
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marcation of congressional commerce power, especially as applied to non-
economic, social legislation targeted at protecting civil rights.
66
In Lopez, the Supreme Court found that the Gun-Free School Zone Act
67was an impermissible application of congressional commerce power. First,
the Court found that the Act was a criminal statute unrelated to economic
matters, either directly or as a part of a larger economic regulatory scheme.68
Second, the Court expressed concern over the potential scope of the statute,
as it did not contain a jurisdictional element limiting its exercise. 69 Third, the
Court noted that neither the statute nor the legislative history contained any
"express congressional findings regarding the effects upon interstate com-
merce of gun possession in a school zone., 70 Fourth, the Court worried that
the inferential leap necessary to find a nexus between guns in school zones
and interstate commerce was so huge that it threatened power traditionally
held by the states.7' Whereas Jones & McLaughlin Steel Corp. marked the
entrance of the modem application of the Commerce Clause to a wide range
of economic matters, Lopez established a defined limit to the power exercised
by Congress in the name of commerce.72
The next Supreme Court analysis of the Commerce Clause came with
United States v. Morrison, in which the Supreme Court examined the Vio-
lence Against Women Act's 73 civil remedy for gender-motivated violence.
74
In Morrison, the plaintiff alleged that the two defendants had raped her while
they were all students at Virginia Polytechnic Institute. 75 After failing to ob-
66. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 568 (1995) ("We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate
noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect
on interstate commerce.")).
67. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
68. Id. at 561. While the Court noted that the line between economic and non-
economic concerns is often blurred, it found nothing in the statute that indicated an
economic concern or element. Id. at 566-67.
69. Id. at 561.
70. Id. at 562-63 (quotation omitted).
71. Id. at 567-68. "[W]e would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner
that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to
a general police power of the sort retained by the States." Id. at 567.
72. See id. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000). The Act enforced the right against gender-based
violence by stating:
A person ... who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender and
thus deprives another of the right ... shall be liable to the party injured, in
an action for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunc-
tive and declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem ap-
propriate.
42 U.S.C. § 13981(b), -(c) (2000).
74. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000).
75. Id. at 602.
[Vol. 70
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tain a criminal conviction or a satisfactory remedy through the university, the
plaintiff sued the two defendants in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia, alleging that the attack violated her right "to be
free from crimes of violence motivated by gender., 76 The defendants argued
that the statute was unconstitutional because it was an impermissible exercise
of congressional commerce power.77
The Supreme Court analyzed the statute under the Lopez standard, stat-
ing that its four-part rationale constituted the appropriate test to determine the
statute's validity. 78 The Court found a number of parallels between Morrison
and Lopez. First, the Court observed that "[g]ender-motivated crimes of vio-
lence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity. '79 The majority
rejected "cost of crime" and "loss of national productivity" arguments be-
cause they would allow Congress to regulate all violent crime and all activi-
ties that might lead to violent crime, regardless of the attenuation of the con-
nection. 0 Second, like Lopez, the Violence Against Women Act did not con-
tain an express jurisdictional element limiting its potential scope. 81 Third, the
Court found the connection between gender-motivated crime and interstate
commerce too attenuated to establish a substantial connection. 82 Despite find-
ing that Congress had fulfilled the third prong of the Lopez test of an eco-
nomic relationship between gender-motivated violence and interstate com-
merce, the Court nonetheless found those facts unpersuasive in light of the
inferential leap necessary to establish that connection. 3 The Court stated that
76. Id. at 604. See also, Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132
F.3d 949, 953 (4th Cir. 1997).
77. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 604. Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit
dismissed the claim, stating that Congress exceeded its authority under the Commerce
Clause in enacting section 13981. Id. at 604.
78. Id. at 609-12.
79. Id. at 613. The Court refrained from adopting a categorical rule against ag-
gregating effects on commerce of non-economic activities, but stated that "thus far in
our Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in nature." Id.
80. Id. at 612-13. "Under the[se] theories ... it is difficult to perceive any limita-
tion on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforcement . . . where
States historically have been sovereign." Id. at 613 (quoting United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)).
8 1. Id. The Court noted that, despite the guidance provided by Lopez, "Congress
elected to cast section 13981's remedy over a wider, and more purely intrastate, body
of violent crime." Id. Moreover, the Court noted that Congress did not need to cast
such a wide remedy as it had the ability to limit the Act's potential scope by providing
a jurisdictional element. As an example of a narrowing jurisdictional element, the
Court pointed to 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1), which penalizes persons who cross state
lines with the "intent to injure, harass, or intimidate" his or her spouse or intimate
partner. Id.
82. Id. at 615.
83. Id. at 614-15.
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"[i]f accepted, petitioner's reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any
crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substan-
tial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption. ' 4
The Court found the portion of the Act extending a right to freedom
from gender-motivated violence unconstitutional. 85 More specifically, it
found that "[t]he regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not
directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate
commerce has always been the province of the States.,1
6
Following Morrison, the Courts of Appeal for the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits have interpreted the jurisdictional clause in the Church Arson Pre-
vention Act to determine the extent of the government's burden to prove that
87the prohibited conduct affected interstate commerce. In United States v.
Grassie,8 8 the defendant was convicted under the Church Arson Prevention
Act for burning down one church and defacing and damaging four others. s9
On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the government's evi-
dence on the jurisdictional element supporting his conviction under Section
247 and the propriety of the district court's instruction to the jury that "any
effect at all" on interstate commerce satisfied the statute's interstate com-
merce requirement. 9° The Tenth Circuit held that because Congress used the
words "affecting commerce" without qualification, it intended to invoke its
full commerce power under the Constitution and, therefore, nothing more
than a de minimis connection to interstate commerce was required.9'
The Grassie Court relied upon its decision in United States v. Malone,
92
in which the Tenth Circuit upheld a district court's jury instruction that the
government need prove only a de minimis effect on interstate commerce to
satisfy the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act.93 The Tenth Circuit stated
84. Id. at 615.
85. Id. at 617.
86. Id. at 618.
87. See United States v. Grassie, 237 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Ballinger, 312 F.3d 1264 (1 1th Cir. 2002), vacated en banc, 369 F.3d 1238 (1 1th
Cir. 2004). Both cases involved the statute's first provision, which criminalized de-
struction of religious real property in interstate commerce, while the case at hand
necessarily implicates the second provision. Grassie, 237 F.3d at 1201-02; Ballinger,
312 F.3d at 1265-66; see 18 U.S.C. § 247 (2000).
88. 237 F.3d 1199.
89. Grassie, 237 F.3d at 1201. During May and June 1998, defendant engaged
in a crime spree throughout New Mexico, destroying property in four Mormon
churches on multiple occasions. Id. at 1202. The defendant's serial attacks on Mor-
mon churches culminated on June 28, 2002, when he broke into a church in Roswell,
New Mexico, and started a fire that completely destroyed the church. Id. at 1203.
90. Id. at 1202, 1205-06.
91. Id. at 1208-09.
92. 222 F.3d 1286 (10th Cir. 2000).
93. Id. at 1208-09; see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (2000). (stating "[w]hoever in any
way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article
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that given the "virtual national epidemic" of church and synagogue arsons,
"mostly identified with African American congregations," Congress intended
to exercise its full authority under the Commerce Clause.
94
In United States v. Ballinger,95 the Eleventh Circuit faced substantially
similar facts to those of the Grassie court, but reached a far different result.
96
Ballinger pled guilty under the Church Arson Prevention Act 97 to four counts
of church arson.98 He conditioned his plea on an as-applied and facial deter-
mination of the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that while he committed
the acts of arson, the statute was unconstitutional both facially and as applied
to him.99 The district court upheld the constitutionality of the act and Bal-
linger appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.'0 0
The Eleventh Circuit considered Ballinger's facial claim, noting that
congressional commerce power "extends to the regulation of activities which
are in or affect interstate commerce."'' ° It held that the statute was constitu-
tional on its face because Congress specifically included a jurisdictional ele-
ment. 10 2 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "[i]n the absence of sufficient
proof of the interstate commerce connection, the statute does not apply to the
arson charged.' 0 3 The court further noted that the jurisdictional element
saves Commerce Clause regulation from a facial attack because it requires a
"case-by-case inquiry, that the activity in question affects interstate com-
merce."
104
The Eleventh Circuit next considered Ballinger's claim that there was
insufficient evidence at trial to show a connection between the acts of arson
or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do,
or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of
a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both."). 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a)
(2000). The Grassie Court distinguished the case from United States v. Jones, 529
U.S. 848 (2000), because in Jones, the Court concluded that Congress had not fully
invoked its authority under the Commerce Clause. Grassie, 237 F.3d at 1208-09.
94. See 237 F.3d at 1209. The court reviewed the congressional record to deter-
mine the impact of church arson on interstate commerce. Id. It noted that churches
engaged in a number of activities across state lines, including: social services, civil
participation, educational and religious activities, the purchase of goods and services,
and the collection and distribution of funds. Id.; 142 CONG. REC. S7908-04 (1996).
95. 312 F.3d 1264 (1 lth Cir. 2002), vacated en banc, 369 F.3d 1238 (1 ith Cir.
2004).
96. Id.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 247(a)(1).
98. Ballinger, 312 F.3d at 1265.
99. Id. at 1265-66.
100. Id. at 1265.
101. Id. at 1268, citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559 (1995).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (citation omitted).
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and interstate commerce. 0 5 The court began by addressing the govemment's
burden of proof on the jurisdictional element of Section 247. 06 It noted the
three categories of activities over which Lopez authorized congressional
commerce power, finding that "arson ... is a purely intrastate activity" and
falls into the third Lopez category. °7 The court reiterated Lopez's holding that
Congress may regulate any activity of intrastate commerce if it substantially
affects interstate commerce.1°8 It noted that "[w]hereas Congress may regu-
late any instrumentality or channel of interstate commerce, the Constitution
permits Congress to regulate only those intrastate activities which have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce."' ° 9
The Eleventh Circuit next addressed the government's contention that,
because Congress had invoked its full authority over interstate commerce, a
de minimis connection to interstate commerce satisfied the Constitution."
The court flatly rejected the notion that the outer limits of congressional au-
thority demanded a lesser connection to commerce."' Rather, the court held
that when Congress invokes its full authority over the Commerce Clause and
"pushes its commerce power to its constitutional limit by seeking to regulate
a purely intrastate activity" there must be a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 12
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished between the regulation of economic
and non-economic activity." 3 It stated that when the "regulated intrastate
activity is a commercial or economic one," the government may show the
required substantial effect through aggregated effects on interstate com-
merce." 4 The aggregation of local effects is not, however, permissible con-
gressional regulation of "intrastate, non-economic activity."
' 15
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1268-69. On this point, defendant argued that the statute requires the
government to prove that his arsons had a substantial effect on interstate commerce,
while the Government argued that even a de minimis connection satisfied the Act. Id.
at 1269.
107. Id. at 1269.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1270. The court further noted that the "regulation of purely intrastate
activity reaches the outer limits of Congress' commerce power." Id.
110. Id.
11. Id. The court stated "[t]he talismanic repetition over the years of the phrase
'fullest extent' of congressional commerce power has led some to confuse this con-
cept of the outer limits of congressional authority for an independent grant of author-
ity." Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1270-71.
114. Id. at 1270. In these cases, the government may add together de minimis
effects of individual circumstances to create a national picture of the effect on com-
merce because the regulation is a part of a "larger regulatory scheme affecting inter-
state commerce." Id. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (holding the effect
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The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that the criminal nature of the statute
gives rise to a heightened level of scrutiny for traditional common-law state
crimes." 6 It stated that the Supreme Court's holdings in Morrison and Lopez
mandate that the government prove that the activity of church arson substan-
tially affected interstate commerce.' 7 The Eleventh Circuit reversed the de-
fendant's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial because it found
that the government failed to prove that the defendant's arsons substantially
affected interstate commerce. "8 The court noted that "[t]he arson of a church
has a substantial effect on interstate commerce if its activities prior to the
arson substantially affected interstate commerce and the arson of that church
terminated those activities."" 9
of one farmer's growth of wheat for personal use affects the larger national effort to
sustain wheat prices and production).
115. Ballinger, 312 F.3d at 1270. The court reiterated, "[w]here such regulation is
at issue, the Constitution requires that the activity, by itself, have economic conse-
quences that substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. The court further stated,
"[nlo aggregation of local effects is permissible to elevate a non-economic activity's
insubstantial effect on interstate commerce into a substantial one in order to support
federal jurisdiction." Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1271. The court distinguished between the use of aggregation under the
Hobbs Act, which plainly regulates economic activity, and the case at hand, in which,
like Morrison, the "non-economic, criminal nature of the conduct" requires a showing
of the conduct at issue's substantial effect on interstate commerce. 1d. The Ballinger
court relied upon the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Jones, 529 U.S. 848
(2000), in which the court examined the connection to interstate commerce necessary
under the federal arson statute. See Ballinger, 312 F.3d at 1271-72. In Jones, the court
held that a privately owned residence does not affect interstate commerce because the
receipt of natural gas, the holding of a mortgage and an insurance policy from out-of-
state were insufficient connections to establish that the residence was used in an activ-
ity affecting commerce. See id. at 1271-72.
118. Id. at 1276.
119. Id. at 1275. The court relied upon its Commerce Clause jurisprudence from
United States v. Odum, 252 F.3d 1289 (11 th Cir. 2002), where it held that the connec-
tions to interstate commerce established by the government in a prosecution under the
federal arson act could not be too passive, minimal, and indirect to substantially affect
interstate commerce. Id. at 1297; Ballinger, 312 F.3d at 1275. In Odum, the Eleventh
Circuit found that the purchase and use of goods from out-of-state donors and contri-
butions to out-of-state church organizations through membership in an intrastate
church organization did not substantially affect commerce. Odum, 252 F.3d at 1275.
In Ballinger, the court found all of the church's connections to interstate commerce
advanced by the government to be too passive, minimal, and indirect, including
"membership in an intrastate church organization that contributed financially to the
national church organization that then redistribute[d] the money around the world."
Ballinger, 312 F.3d at 1275. Some examples of these slight connections include:
insurance proceeds from an out-of-state insurance company; use of materials and
natural gas purchased in interstate commerce; the purchase of goods and services in
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Applying this background to Corum, substantial authority exists to pun-
ish the defendant in the case at hand under 18 U.S.C. § 844(e) for using a
telephone as an instrumentality of commerce. 20 However, Morrison places
the Eighth Circuit holding under the Church Arson Prevention Act in grave
doubt. The federal protection of houses of worship from violence is a regula-
tion of non-economic, criminal behavior with a tenuous connection to inter-
state commerce.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
A. 18 US.C. § 844(e)
In United States v. Corurn,l the Eighth Circuit faced several challenges
to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 844(e). 22 First, Com argued that his
convictions should be set aside because the government failed to prove that
his conduct had an effect on interstate commerce.' 23 He stated that the evi-
dence showed that his three telephone calls were all made intrastate and did
not involve any commercial transactions.' 24 The government, on the other
hand, argued that the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the interstate com-
merce element of Section 844(e) because the statute, by its plain meaning,
included a telephone as an instrument of interstate commerce, and thus the
statute applied whenever a telephone was used to convey a threat. 125
The Eighth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence de novo in
the light most favorable to the government.' 26 It began this review by ad-
dressing the conduct at issue under Section 844(e) as distinguished from the
conduct required under the federal arson statute.127 The federal arson statute
prohibits damaging real or personal property used in interstate commerce by
means of fire and explosives and requires proof that the damaged or de-
stroyed property was used in an active employment for commercial purposes
and, courts have determined, "not merely a passive, passing or past connec-
tion to commerce.' 2 8 The court found that the federal arson statute criminal-
ized a different kind of activity than Section 844(e) and, therefore, required a
interstate commerce, including radio broadcasts, food, flowers and groceries; and the
attendance at the churches from out-of-state guests, such as hosting of visiting pas-
tors. Id. at 1275-76.
120. See supra notes 57-64 and the accompanying text.
121. 362 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 865 (2005).
122. Corum, 362 F.3d at 492.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 493.
125. See id.; Brief for the United States as Appellee, United States v. Corum, 362
F.3d 489, at *12 (8th Cir. 2004) (03-2497).
126. Corum, 362 F.3d at 492-93.
127. Id. at 493; see 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (Supp. 2004).
128. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 848-49 (2000).
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"different type[] of conduct to establish the required interstate nexus.' 29 The
Eighth Circuit held that Section 844(e) merely required the government to
prove that Corum used an instrument of interstate commerce, in this case a
telephone, to communicate a threat; the plain language of the statute did not
compel further proof of an interstate nexus. 30 In so holding, the court stated
that telephones, even when their use is strictly intrastate, are instruments of
interstate commerce,13' for "intrastate and interstate telephone communica-
tions are a part of an aggregate telephonic system."'132 Corum's use of a tele-
phone to make threats clearly fell within the plain language of the statute;
thus, the evidence "was sufficient to grant federal jurisdiction over his
crime.
, 133
Second, Corum argued that the application of Section 844(e) was un-
constitutional under Lopez. 134 Corum averred that the purpose of the statute is
not to protect the telephone system, and, therefore, the government must
prove that a defendant's use of the phone "was actually used to affect" inter-
state commerce. 35 The government's response asserted that the application of
the statute to Corum's threatening calls was within congressional commerce
power because "[i]t is well established that telephones, even when used intra-
state, are instruments of interstate commerce."'
' 36
The Eighth Circuit stated that the instant case clearly falls under the sec-
ond of the three categories of activity identified by the Supreme Court in Lo-
pez. 3 7 While this was an issue of first impression for the Eighth Circuit, other
circuits have held that when a statute regulates an instrument of interstate
commerce, no further evidence of interstate commerce was required.'38 The
129. Corum, 362 F.3d at 493; see, e.g., United States v. Odum, 252 F.3d 1289,
1296-97 (11 th Cir. 2001) (noting that while churches can and do engage in commerce,
evidence showing that the church received donations bought books from an out-of-
state source and indirectly contributed to an out of state church organization was "too
passive, too minimal and too indirect to substantially affect interstate commerce");
United States v. Ryan, 227 F.3d 1058, 1064 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that an unoccu-
pied commercial building did not have an active connection to interstate commerce
and, thus, was not covered under section 844(i)).




134. Id.; Brief of Appellant at 26-27, United States v. Corum, 362 F.3d 489 (8th
Cir. 2004) (03-2497).
135. Corum, 362 F.3d at 493.
136. Brief for the United States as Appellee at 12, United States v. Corum, 362
F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2004) (03-2497).
137. Corum, 362 F.3d at 494; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995);
see infra at III.
138. Corum, 362 F.3d at 494; United States v. Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir.
2002) (holding that evidence of substantial effect is unnecessary when a statute regu-
lates an activity defined under the first two Lopez categories.); United States v.
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Eighth Circuit elected to construe the telephone as an instrumentality of inter-
state commerce, joining the holdings of the First, Second, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits, 139 and, in so doing, found the First Circuit's holding in United States
v. Gilbert4 ° particularly persuasive. 141
The Eighth Circuit further noted that its findings were consistent with
United States v. Baker, 42 in which the court stated that "[p]urely intrastate
activity falls within this power when an instrumentality of interstate com-
merce is used. 1 43 Thus, the Eighth Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. § 844(e)
merely required proof of the use of an instrumentality of interstate commerce
to satisfy the Commerce Clause.
144
Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 318-19 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the first two categories of
Lopez extend to intrastate use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce); United
States v. Clayton, 108 F.3d 1114, 1117 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that the second Lopez
category encompasses the use of telephones and no further nexus of interstate com-
merce is necessary to prove the constitutionality of their regulation).
139. Gil, 297 F.3d at 100 (holding that evidence of substantial effect is unneces-
sary when a statute regulates an activity defined under the first two Lopez catego-
ries.); Marek, 238 F.3d at 318-19 (holding that the first two categories of Lopez ex-
tend to intrastate use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce); Clayton, 108 F.3d
at 1117 (holding that the second Lopez category encompasses the use of telephones
and no further nexus of interstate commerce is necessary to prove the constitutionality
of their regulation).
140. 181 F.3d 152 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that because all intrastate telephone
systems are a part of a larger aggregate system, "[tihe use of the telephone . . .to
make a bomb threat was, without more, sufficient to sustain jurisdiction under the
[I]nterstate [C]ommerce [C]lause."); see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
141. Corum, 362 F.3d at 494.
142. 82 F.3d 273 (8th Cir. 1997). In Baker, the Eighth Circuit held that an intra-
state electronic transfer of funds between two banks connected to an interstate net-
work of ATMs satisfied the jurisdictional clause of the Travel Act. Id. at 275-76. The
Travel Act criminalizes unlawful acts performed in the "stream of commerce" or
using a channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2000). It
punishes
[w]hoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the mail or
any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent to
(1) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or
(2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity; or
(3) otherwise promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the pro-
motion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of any unlawful ac-
tivity.
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
143. United States v. Baker, 82 F.3d 273, 275 (8th Cir. 1997).
144. Corum, 362 F.3d at 495.
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B. The Church Arson Prevention Act
1. Eighth Circuit
In Corum, the defendant also attacked the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his convictions under the Church Arson Prevention Act, 14 arguing
that the government failed to prove the violation was in or affected interstate
commerce. 146 The government responded that there was sufficient evidence to
show that the offense satisfied the statutory requirements. 147 The Eighth Cir-
cuit defined the offense at issue as "the intentional obstruction of or attempt
to obstruct the enjoyment of the free exercise of religious beliefs of the mem-
bers of each of the three synagogues in the Twin Cities area."'
148
145. Id. at 497.
146. Id. Corum also challenged the constitutionality of the Church Arson Preven-
tion Act, claiming that it facially violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. Id. The Eighth Circuit applied the Lemon test and held the statute consti-
tutional, as it had a secular purpose, neither advanced not inhibited religion in its
primary or principle effect, and did not foster excessive government entanglements
with religious organizations. Id. at 495-96. The court found that the law had a secular
purpose because it sought to curb threats of violence targeted against religious institu-
tions that affect interstate commerce. Id. at 496. It noted that the rationale for the
secular purpose requirement is to "prevent the relevant governmental decision maker
- in this case Congress - from abandoning neutrality and acting with the intent of
promoting a particular point of view in religious matters." Id. (citing Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 335 (1987)). The court stated that the secular purpose need not be the only
purpose of the statute, but that Congress's motivation must not have been wholly
religious. Id. The court also found that the statute did not advance or inhibit religion
as its primary effect was to "curb violence and threats of violence that adversely af-
fect an aspect of interstate commerce Congress found to be particularly vulnerable to
violent interference." Id. Thus, any effect of the statute would not be an advancement
of religion by the government itself. Id. Finally, the court found that because the gov-
ernment "is not required to engage in persuasive monitoring of or intrusion into the
activities of these [religious] organizations," the statute did not foster an excessive
entanglement with religion. Id. The Eighth Circuit held the statute constitutional. Id.
at 497. It noted that the possibility remained that the "Church Arson Prevention Act
will be abused in application. However, we believe the best course of action is vigi-
lance as opposed to invalidation of the Act." Id. at 497. For a strikingly contrasting
approach to the purpose and effects requirements of the Lemon test, see Cutter v.
Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act unconstitutional as violative of the Establishment Clause be-
cause the statute's provision requiring courts to apply strict scrutiny to all substantial
burdens to the free exercise of religion has the effect of providing greater protection
to religiously-motivated conduct than other conscientious conduct, and thus advanc-
ing religion).
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The court noted that it reviews sufficiency of evidence claims de novo,
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and would
reverse a conviction only if no reasonable jury could have found a defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' 49 The court then held that, based upon the
trial record, "the government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to




In Corum, the Eighth Circuit neither sets forth its rationale for finding
the evidence supporting the conviction of Corum sufficient under the Church
Arson Prevention Act of 1996 nor articulates the government's burden in
proving the jurisdictional element of the statute.' 51 However, the district court
ruling on Corum's motion for acquittal held that the government presented
sufficient evidence and that a mere de minimis showing of an effect on inter-
state commerce satisfied the statute. 5 2
In his motion, Corum argued that the government did not prove that his
conduct actually affected interstate commerce. 15 3 He did not dispute the gov-
ernment's evidence that all three synagogues affected interstate commerce to
some degree, but stated that, under Morrison, the government must prove a
substantial connection between his offense and interstate commerce' 54 The
district court noted that it instructed the jury that "it did not need to find a
substantial connection with interstate commerce, but only that Corum's acts
affected interstate commerce to some extent, however slight.' 55 Considering
149. Id. at 497.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 495-97.
152. United States v. Corum, No. 01-236, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at *17 (D.
Minn. April 17, 2003), aff'd 362 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2004).
153. Id.
154. Id. at *5-6, 7 n.2. The government's evidence of the three synagogues' con-
nections to interstate commerce included paying dues to a central organization with
offices in other states; members residing in other states and countries, hosting both
foreign and out-of-state guest speakers, running a gift shop that sells merchandise
from around the world, purchasing religious articles in interstate commerce; and
sponsoring students attending camp in other states. Id. The district court found that
the evidence presented in this case was more significant than that of the churches in
Ballinger, but the court assumed, arguendo, that the contacts were equally significant.
Id.
155. Id. at *5-6 (quotation omitted). The district court noted that the Eighth Cir-
cuit has not set forth the degree of effect required by the jurisdictional element under
the statute. Id. at *6. We must assume, by default, that the Eighth Circuit's holding in
this case encompasses the district court's de minimis standard, as it is unclear if the
defendant's conviction would have survived had the court held the government to a
higher burden. Because the Eighth Circuit did not set forth its reasoning for finding
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the Ballinger and Grassie holdings, the Corum court noted that Ballinger was
contrary to its own jury instructions but found the Eleventh Circuit's reason-
ing unpersuasive.
5 6
The court reasoned that its instruction was based upon "aggregation"
under which "Congress may regulate individual intrastate activities that alone
may not substantially affect interstate commerce, but that in the absence of
national regulation, 'would undercut a larger regulatory scheme affecting
interstate commerce."",157 It noted that Ballinger held that the aggregation
principle only applies to intrastate activities that are commercial or economic
in nature and that a "de minimis connection to interstate commerce is suffi-
cient only for offenses that are economic or commercial in nature."'' 5 8 More
specifically, the Ballinger court held that the offense of arson under the
Church Arson Prevention Act is non-economic and, hence, a de minimis
showing is insufficient.'59
The district court disagreed with the Ballinger court and held that Lopez
and Morrison did not prevent the use of a de minimis connection to interstate
commerce.' 60 It reasoned that, while Ballinger defined the conduct under the
statute in terms of arson, the Act actually criminalizes the intentional obstruc-
tion of the free-exercise of religion.' 61 The district court argued that the stat-
the government's evidence sufficient, it is also unclear to what extent this holding
applies to other conduct under the Church Arson Prevention Act, such as the inten-
tional damaging of real property or arson motivated by racial, ethnic or religious ani-
mus. See 18 U.S.C. § 247(a)(2) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
156. Corum, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at *6-8 (citing United States v. Bal-
linger, 312 F.3d 1264, 1270 (1 1th Cir. 2002)). The district court noted that in both
Grassie and Ballinger, the lower courts instructed their juries that minimal proof of a
connection to interstate commerce was sufficient. Id. at *6-7. See supra text accom-
panying notes 88-119.
157. Corum, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at *8 (citing Ballinger, 312 F.3d at
1270 (11 th Cir. 2002)). The district court noted that "[a]ggregation applies when a
general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, and the de minimis
character of the individual instances arising under that statute is thus of no conse-
quence." Id. (emphasis and citations omitted).
158. Id. at *10-11. The district court stated that the Ballinger court relied on the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Lopez and Morrison. Id. It reasoned that Lopez and
Morrison stand for the proposition that Congress cannot regulate common law, non-
economic crimes unless they substantially affect interstate commerce, and to hold
otherwise in this case would be contrary to the Supreme Court's mandate. Id. at *11.
159. Id.
160. Id. The district court reasoned that, because 18 U.S.C. § 247 has both an
express jurisdictional element and is supported by congressional findings on the ef-
fects of church arson on interstate commerce, the only ground upon which Morrison
and Lopez apply is the finding that the statute is "purely non-economic." Id.
161. Id. at *12. The district court also stated that the Ballinger majority defines
the conduct under the statute to mean "simple arson" because it relies upon United
States v. Jones and United States v. Odum for support. Id. at *12-13 Because Jones
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ute's purpose and history indicated that it was designed to regulate more than
the "local crime of arson."'' 62 Rather, Congress enacted the Church Arson
Prevention Act to "counter a rash of arsons and attacks on houses of worship
across the nation." Thus, the district court found that arson of a house of wor-
ship may be an economic offense because churches and synagogues "engage
in economic activity that effects [sic] interstate commerce.' 63 Because
churches and synagogues are engaged in commerce, an attack upon them can
be an economic offense under 18 U.S.C. § 247, which is consistent with the
congressional intent in enacting section 247 to expand federal jurisdiction
over attacks on houses of worship.' 64 Thus, the district court held that
churches engage in commerce, an attack upon them is an economic crime,
and, therefore, the aggregation principle applies so that a conviction based
upon a de minimis standard of proof is correct.
65
V. COMMENT
In the instant case, the Eighth Circuit was given two opportunities to
clarify its Commerce Clause jurisprudence following Lopez and Morrison. It
dealt with the standard of proof for the federal arson statute, the district court deter-
mined that the Ballinger court mistakenly relied upon Jones for guidance. Corum,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at *12-13.
162. Id. at *13. The district court stated that for the Ballinger court to define the
regulated conduct as "mere arson" ignored the purpose of the statute. Id. at *14.
163. Id. The district court relied on United States v. Odum, which held that, while
churches can and do engage in commerce, the government must still prove that the
church's activities substantially affected commerce and that the conduct of the defen-
dant affected that activity. 252 F.3d 1289, 1294, 1299 (11 th Cir. 2001). Second, the
court cited Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, Me., which held that
state denial of a tax credit to a non-profit church camp because its members were
predominately from out of state violates the Dormant Commerce Clause. 520 U.S.
564, 570-71 (1997). In reference to Town of Harrison, the district court noted that the
Supreme Court held that Congress may regulate charitable and non-profit entities
under its Commerce Clause power. Corum, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at *15. This
authority deserves a bit of clarification. What the Court in Town of Harrison said was,
"[w]e see no reason why the nonprofit character of an enterprise should exclude it
from the coverage of either the affirmative or the negative aspect of the Commerce
Clause." Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. at 584. At best, this stands for the proposition
that the non-profit nature of an entity does not remove it from congressional purview.
However, nowhere in the case does the Supreme Court indicate that Congress has a
"regulatory scheme" over non-profits or that churches are per se commercial in na-
ture, as the district court in Corum suggests when it relies upon the above authorities
to state that churches are involved in commerce and, therefore, an attack upon them is
economic in nature. Corum, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at * 15.
164. Corum, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at *15.
165. Id. at *16-17.
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took full advantage of the first to reaffirm the plain meaning of 18 U.S.C. §
844(e) and reiterate its reasoning in line with that of other circuits. However,
the Eighth Circuit treated the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence required
to prove the jurisdictional element of the Church Arson Prevention Act with
short shrift and little foresight. Its holding in the instant case is in contradic-
tion with that of Lopez and Morrison, and is without even a modicum of rea-
soning in support.
A. Section 844(e)
Lopez clearly states that "Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate activi-
ties." 166 Since Lopez, the Supreme Court has not had occasion to further de-
fine "instrumentalities," but the term has a historical and detailed defini-
tion. 167 There is substantial authority supporting the Eighth Circuit's holding
in the instant case that an intrastate telephone system is an instrumentality of
interstate commerce. 168 Proof of that fact, without more, sustains federal ju-
risdiction under a statute that criminalizes the use of the telephone as an in-
strumentality of interstate commerce.
B. The Church Arson Prevention Act.
In addition to clarifying Congress' ability to regulate the channels, in-
strumentalities, and persons or things in interstate commerce, Lopez also
stated that Congress may regulate purely intrastate activities which have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce or which have a de minimis effect
on commerce but are a part of a larger economic regulatory scheme.
169
In the case at hand, the Church Arson Prevention Act of 1996 criminal-
izes damage and destruction to churches and other houses of worship, as well
as intentional obstruction of a person's free-exercise of his or her religion.
70
The Eighth Circuit's decision to affirm the district court's de minimis stan-
dard of proof for the required connection to interstate commerce opened up
the statute to greater constitutional attack.
In ruling on Corum's motion for acquittal, the district court either glazed
over or completely avoided all but one of the four prongs of the test estab-
166. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
167. The definition of "instrumentalities" is ever in flux. As our nation's technol-
ogy changes, new infrastructure supporting interstate commerce emerges. However,
given the nation's long reliance on the telephone system as a method of communicat-
ing economic messages, the conclusion in the instant case seems self-evident.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 52-60.
169. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-60.
170. 18 U.S.C. § 247 (2000 & Supp. 11 2002).
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lished by Lopez and Morrison to determine if intrastate activity substantially
affects interstate commerce.17 1 First, where Lopez and Morrison require a
heightened showing for non-economic, criminal regulation, the court found
that, because churches do affect commerce, the statute was economic in na-
ture.' 72 Its reasoning stands not upon a showing of the nationwide economic
impact of churches on interstate commerce or even upon the impact of the
three synagogues in the instant case, but upon the authority of Camps New-
found/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison.173
In Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 1 4 the Supreme Court examined the ap-
plication of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine on the State of Maine's
activities in withholding a non-profit tax exemption because the majority of
campers at a non-profit, religious camp came from other states. 175 It held that
Maine's withholding of the exemption impermissibly burdened interstate
commerce. 17 6 The Court's reasoning in Camps Newfound/Owatonna is per-
suasive to show that churches can affect commerce and that, if so, Congress
could regulate them. However, it does not support the proposition that all
churches necessarily engage in commercial activity.' 77 Such a holding would
obliterate the second, and perhaps most important, element set forth in Lopez
and Morrison, as it would allow the regulation of non-economic activities
without a jurisdictional limitation. 178
In Morrison, the Court specifically stated that a statute seeking to regu-
late intrastate activity based upon congressional commerce power must have
a jurisdictional element to limit the sweep of the statute.17 9 The Court, ex-
pressing grave concern with maintaining a meaningful distinction between
"what is truly national and what is truly local," stated that "[t]he regulation
and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentali-
ties, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the
province of the States." 80 Thus, the purpose of the jurisdictional element is to
restrict federal reach to only those activities that are "truly national."' 8'
However, the district court in Corum misinterpreted the purpose of the
Court's requirement of a jurisdictional element. While it briefly noted the
171. See United States v. Corum, No. 01-236, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at
*16 (D. Minn. April 17, 2003), aff'd 362 F.3d 489 (8th Cir. 2004).
172. Id. at *14-16.
173. Id. at *14-15.
174. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 593-94.
177. But see Corum, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at *14-16. The district court
stated that "precedent establishes that houses of worship do engage in commerce." Id.
at *16-17.
178. See supra notes 65-84 and accompanying text.
179. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (2000).
180. Id. 617-18.
181. Id. at 618.
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requirement, its analysis regarding the "economic nature" of church activities
completely abrogates any limitation that the element might have provided.
Indeed, the district court found that "attacks or threats to attack houses of
worship are commercial or economic in nature."' 82 If this analysis were to be
followed, every house of worship and home in America would have sufficient
connections with interstate commerce to warrant untold federal legislation,
because the Eighth Circuit allowed a de minimis connection between inter-
state commerce and the conduct alleged, regardless of any effect on com-
merce, to establish federal jurisdiction over a local crime.' 8 3 Not only does
this approach obliterate the distinction between what is truly local and what is
truly national, but it extends a plenary police power to Congress that is in
direct opposition to Lopez and Morrison.
184
Perhaps the gravest problem with the district court's analysis is that it
stands in direct opposition to the intent of Congress in passing the Church
Arson Prevention Act. In Lopez, the Supreme Court criticized the Gun-Free
School Zone Act because it contained no congressional findings regarding the
effects of gun use and violence on interstate commerce. 185 The presence of
such findings would assist the court in evaluating the legislative judgment of
how the activity affects interstate commerce. 186 According to the Congres-
sional Record, the sponsors of the Church Arson Prevention Act stated:
In Lopez, the Court found that the conduct to be regulated did not
have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce and, therefore,
was not within the Federal Government's reach under the interstate
[C]ommerce [C]lause of the Constitution. Subsection (b),18 7 unlike
the provision at issue in Lopez, requires the prosecution to prove
an interstate commerce nexus in order to establish a criminal viola-
tion.'8 8
Members of Congress understood the limitations established in Lopez
and sought to craft an important piece of social legislation within that frame.
However, if the Act is construed without a jurisdictional element, it clearly
reaches beyond the activity Congress sought to criminalize and invades an
area Lopez reserved as "truly local.' 8 9
182. Corum, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at *17.
183. Id.
184. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618.
185. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 563 (1995).
186. Id.
187. 18 U.S.C. § 247(b) states, "The circumstances referred to in subsection (a)
are that the offense is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. §
247(b) (2000 & Supp. II 2002).
188. 142 CONG. REC. S7098-04 (1996) (emphasis added).
189. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
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Finally, both Morrison and Lopez disfavored sustaining Commerce
Clause regulation when the nexus is a result of attenuated connections and
inferential leaps.190 The Supreme Court noted its concern that attenuated con-
nections opened the possibility that Congress might regulate whole areas
traditionally reserved to the states.' 9' It further noted the danger in aggregat-
ing the effects of violent, criminal conduct upon interstate commerce because
"they would permit Congress to 'regulate not only all violent crime, but all
activities that might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they
relate to interstate commerce.' ' 192 The Court stated that "thus far in our Na-
tion's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate
activity only where that activity is economic in nature.' 93
While the other three elements presented by Lopez and Morrison pro-
vide guidance, the fourth element is where the Court is most adamant about
what is barred by the Constitution, for the Court remains concerned about
allowing attenuated connections between activities and interstate commerce
to establish federal jurisdiction over a local crime. 194 Nonetheless, the district
court in Corum did not even mention this element in its analysis.
If all houses of worship affect interstate commerce, the connection must
lie in the aggregate effect of church arson on interstate commerce. The nexus
must lie either in adding together all the goods that go unpurchased in a given
year because of bombing threats or destruction of church property or in all the
out-of-state visitors who failed to travel because of fear. 95 Such tenuous con-
nections are exactly what Lopez and Morrison held unconstitutional, in an
effort to prevent the risk of everything in our consumer-driven world becom-
ing viewed by the courts as interstate commerce and, thus, within congres-
sional commerce power.'96
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's logic in a mere sentence;
it held that "[t]he record reveals that the government presented sufficient evi-
dence for the jury to have determined the offense . ..affected interstate
190. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612-13 (2000); Lopez, 514 U.S. at
564-65.
191. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66. The Court noted that this "rationale lacks any real
limits because, depending on the level of generality, any activity can be looked upon
as commercial." Id. at 565. It expressed concern that such reasoning would lead to
federal control over education, child rearing, and family law. Id. at 565-66.
192. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564).
193. Id. at 613.
194. Id. at 612-13; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66.
195. In fact, these activities are exactly what the Corum court found as sufficient
proof of the jurisdictional element. See United States v. Corum, No. 01-236, 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at *7 n.2 (D. Minn. April 17, 2003), aff'd 362 F.3d 489 (8th
Cir. 2004).
196. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66.
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commerce."' 197 However, the only reason the jury came to this conclusion was
that the district court instructed it that any effect at all would suffice.'98 "Any
effect at all" is not a constitutionally appropriate standard in judging the re-
quired interstate commerce nexus under the statute. In holding this standard
acceptable, the Eighth Circuit reaches beyond the outer limits of commerce
power into a realm that threatens the very structure of our federal republic.1 99
Moreover, the court distorts the meaning of "economic regulation" until it
bears no resemblance to commerce.
The difficulty in scrutinizing congressional commerce power in the
Church Arson Prevention Act is that it is a socially compelling cause. Ameri-
cans want the government to extend positive freedom from violence. That
desire is heightened when the violence is motivated by racial, religious, eth-
nic, national origin or gender-based animus. When faced with the fact that
seventy-five church fires occurred nationwide within an eighteen-month pe-
riod2 0 or that one in eight women has been the victim of forcible rape at
some point in her lifetime,20 Americans demand a response from the federal
government. A desire to utilize the resources and power of the federal gov-
ernment to remedy wrongs is at its highest when Americans perceive a crime
epidemic. The Church Arson Prevention Act passed Congress unanimously
because these were not discrete events occurring in one state or region but
were nationwide occurrences. 202
However, giving the federal government a plenary police power over all
criminal actions that affect interstate commerce in the aggregate, be they vio-
lent rapes, church arsons, gun possessions, or newly emerging threats, would
fundamentally change the federal character of the republic. 20 3 These crimes
lie squarely within the general police power of the states to regulate the
health, safety, welfare and morals of their citizens; federalizing them over-
steps the carefully-crafted balance between national and local government.
Given the extensive changes in American society since the founding of the
nation, upsetting this balance may be an appropriate course of action, but to
do so is a decision that must be given effect by constitutional amendment, not
by legislative determination or judicial fiat.
197. United States v. Corum, 362 F.3d 489, 497 (8th Cir. 2004). Compare this
succinct statement to the almost three pages in which the court outlined its reasoning
for finding that a telephone is an instrumentality of interstate commerce. Id. at 493-
95.
198. Corum, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7726, at *5-6.
199. See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560-6 1.
200. 142 CONG. REC. S7297-04 (daily ed. June 28, 1996).
201. Johanna R. Shargel, Note, In Defense of the Civil Rights Remedy of the Vio-
lence Against Women Act, 106 YALE L.J. 1849, 1850 (1997).
202. 142 CONG. REc. S7297-04 (daily ed. June 28, 1996) (discussing the wave of
violence against churches prior to the passage of the Church Arson Prevention Act).
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It is important to see the balance Congress struck in drafting this Act. As
Senator Faircloth, one of the sponsors of the statute, suggests:
In most of these cases, State and local law enforcement is more
than capable of handling arson investigations.... But there may be
special circumstances such as criminals moving State to State set-
ting fires where Federal assistance and a Federal statute is needed
to adequately resolve the problem and correct the situation.
204
The Church Arson Prevention Act should not be construed by courts as
the federalizing of all church arsons but as a congressional desire to provide
the power and the resources of the federal government when the duties and
responsibilities of the federal government are implicated.
VI. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Corum, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's holding that a mere de minimis connection between interstate com-
merce and the prohibited conduct satisfied the Commerce Clause because
churches engage in commercial activity. In contrast to the circuit court's find-
ing that telephones are instrumentalities of commerce, this decision is pat-
ently inconsistent with Lopez and Morrison. While the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in this case, it remains to be seen how the Court will address this
issue, as this decision perpetuates a split among the courts of appeals and
confusion for Congress in crafting civil rights legislation.
COURTNEY C. STIRRAT
204. 142 CONG. REC. S6, 937-02, S6, 938 (daily ed. June 26, 1996).
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